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ARTICLE OPEN
High-dimensional quantum key distribution based on
multicore ﬁber using silicon photonic integrated circuits
Yunhong Ding 1, Davide Bacco1, Kjeld Dalgaard1, Xinlun Cai2, Xiaoqi Zhou3, Karsten Rottwitt1 and Leif Katsuo Oxenløwe1
Quantum key distribution provides an efﬁcient means to exchange information in an unconditionally secure way. Historically,
quantum key distribution protocols have been based on binary signal formats, such as two polarization states, and the transmitted
information efﬁciency of the quantum key is intrinsically limited to 1 bit/photon. Here we propose and experimentally demonstrate,
for the ﬁrst time, a high-dimensional quantum key distribution protocol based on space division multiplexing in multicore ﬁber
using silicon photonic integrated lightwave circuits. We successfully realized three mutually unbiased bases in a four-dimensional
Hilbert space, and achieved low and stable quantum bit error rate well below both the coherent attack and individual attack limits.
Compared to previous demonstrations, the use of a multicore ﬁber in our protocol provides a much more efﬁcient way to create
high-dimensional quantum states, and enables breaking the information efﬁciency limit of traditional quantum key distribution
protocols. In addition, the silicon photonic circuits used in our work integrate variable optical attenuators, highly efﬁcient multicore
ﬁber couplers, and Mach-Zehnder interferometers, enabling manipulating high-dimensional quantum states in a compact and
stable manner. Our demonstration paves the way to utilize state-of-the-art multicore ﬁbers for noise tolerance high-dimensional
quantum key distribution, and boost silicon photonics for high information efﬁciency quantum communications.
npj Quantum Information  (2017) 3:25 ; doi:10.1038/s41534-017-0026-2
INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an attractive quantum
technology that provides a means to securely share secret keys
between two clients (Alice and Bob).1–4 Traditional QKD is based
on binary signal formats, such as the BB84 protocol where the
quantum information is encoded in the polarization domain.5 Four
polarization states create a set of two mutually unbiased basis
(MUBs) in a two-dimensional Hilbert space which are used for
establishing quantum keys between two parties. In these binary
QKD systems the information efﬁciency is limited to 1 bit/photon.
Recently, tremendous efforts have been put into developing novel
protocols to increase the information efﬁciency.6–10 High-
dimensional QKD (HD-QKD) based on qudit encoding (unit of
information in a N dimension space) is an efﬁcient technique to
achieve high information efﬁciency for QKD systems.11–18
Furthermore, HD-QKD protocols exhibit higher resilience to noise,
allowing for lower signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the received
signal,10 which in turn may be translated into longer transmission
distances.19 One interesting way to achieve HD-QKD is to use
space division multiplexing technology, where the spatial dimen-
sion is used to carry the quantum states. In this context, optical
angular momentum (OAM) modes has been proposed for HD-QKD
protocol, and demonstrated over a free-space link using discrete
components. QKD systems will eventually be merged with optical
ﬁber transmission, so as to combine the classical internet with a
quantum internet.20–23 However, the transmission of OAM modes
over long distance ﬁber links is very challenging due to inter-
modal crosstalk. An alternative approach is to use separate cores
in multicore ﬁbers (MCFs), which have been widely studied for in
ultra-high capacity ﬁber communication, owing to the large
potential multiplicity of cores and the low crosstalk between
cores.24, 25
On the other hand, photonic integration has played a critical
role in recent quantum information revolution by integrating
functionalites of traditional discrete bulky components into ultra-
compact chips.26, 27 Photonic integrated circuits (PICs) provide
excellent optical phase stability, making them particularly suitable
for manipulating quantum states in compact chips with low
energy consumption. Binary QKD systems have been demon-
strated using integrated circuits.28, 29 Silicon photonics technology
has been a powerful means to combine the assets of integrated
photonics with complementary metal-oxide semiconductor tech-
nologies. In this paper, we demonstrate the ﬁrst HD-QKD protocol
based on MCFs using silicon PICs. We prove that manipulation of
the high dimensional quantum states in MCFs is feasible. We
successfully prepare three mutually unbiased bases with four
dimensional quantum states (ququart) and send these through a
seven-core ﬁber. High ﬁdelity is obtained in tomography mea-
surements. Stable and low quantum bit error rate (QBER), below
threshold limits, is achieved for more than 10min.
RESULTS
Protocol deﬁnition
Most of the QKD protocols are based on the concept of MUBs.
For instance the bases {B0 = |Φ0,i i = 0, 1,…, N−1〉} and {B1 = |Φ1, j j =
0, 1, …, N−1〉} are orthogonal bases of a N-dimensional Hilbert
space HN. These bases are deﬁned as mutually unbiased if and
Received: 20 March 2017 Revised: 19 May 2017 Accepted: 24 May 2017
1Department of Photonics Engineering, Technical University of Denmark, 2800 Kgs., Lyngby, Denmark; 2School of Electronics and Information Technology, State Key Laboratory
of Optoelectronic Materials and Technologies, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China and 3School of Physics and Engineering, State Key Laboratory of Optoelectronic
Materials and Technologies, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China
Correspondence: Yunhong Ding (yudin@fotonik.dtu.dk) or Davide Bacco (dabac@fotonik.dtu.dk)
www.nature.com/npjqi
Published in partnership with The University of New South Wales
only if
Φ0;i Φ1;j
  2 ¼ 1
N
(1)
In other words in a set of MUBs {B0, B1, B2,…, Bk, Bn} if we
measure a state in Bn basis, and this state was prepared in Bk basis
(with k ≠ j), all the outputs are equally probable. It has been
proven that the maximum number of the MUBs in a Hilbert space
of dimension N is N + 1, where N is a integer power of a prime
number.30 In our analysis we consider the case of three MUBs
reported in Eq. (2) for an Hilbert space of four dimension (N = 4).
The main difference is related to the tolerable threshold of the
QBER and the maximum achievable value of secret key rate. A
more detailed discussion follows in next paragraph. The set of the
three MUBs, used in the proposed HD-QKD system, can be deﬁned
as a linear combination of:
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2
p 1 0 0 0ð Þ
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We can easily prove that the set M0, M1, M2 satisﬁes the
mutually unbiased assumption, |〈M0|M1〉|
2 = |〈M0|M2〉|
2 = |〈M1|
M2〉|
2 = 1/4. Physically, |A〉, |B〉, |C〉, and |D〉 represent the quantum
states related to the four individual cores of a multi-core ﬁber, as
shown in the inset of Fig. 1a. By tuning the Mach–Zehnder
interferometers (MZIs), situated in the transmitter chip, Alice
creates a quantum superposition between cores. In this way she
prepares one of the states in the three MUBs. A random number
generator is used for basis and states choice. Before the quantum
measurement, Bob randomly choose one of the three MUBs
tuning the corresponding MZI. In such a way, Bob creates
interference between different cores and he correctly measures
the quantum states sent by Alice. As in the BB84 protocol, after
the measurements, a distillation process is required. In this
procedure Alice and Bob discard all the data related to a different
basis choice. At this point Alice and Bob share an identical
quantum key, useful for encryption and decryption of the plain
text.
Secret key rate
One of the most important parameters in a communication
system is the achievable rate. In particular, in a QKD system, the
major criterion is represented by the secret key rate: number of
bit/s or bit/pulse that Alice and Bob can establish as useful key.
A general formula for the standard protocols can be written as:
R  IAB min IAE; IBEð Þ; (3)
where IAB represents the classical mutual information between
Alice and Bob (IXY = H(X)−H(X|Y)), and the marginal entropy is
deﬁned as H Xð Þ ¼Px2X p xð Þ log p xð Þ. The right term of Eq. (3),
min(IAE and IBE), is related to the quantum mutual information
between Alice and Eve or Bob and Eve. In the following analysis
we consider only the mutual information between Alice and Eve,
but a more complete analysis can be done: in this way the secret
key rate value is estimated with a lower bound. Furthermore, we
work under the assumption of trusted-device scenario, in which
Eve cannot modify the efﬁciency of Bobs detectors. In case of
ququart QKD system the ﬁnal secret key rate formula must be
adapted. The mutual information between Alice and Bob is:
IAB ¼ log2 Nð Þ þ F log2 Fð Þ þ 1 Fð Þ log2
1 F
N  1
 
; (4)
where N is the dimension of the Hilbert space and F = 1−D
represents the ﬁdelity of Bob. D is deﬁned as the disturbance in
the communication link. In order to extract a bound on the ﬁnal
secret key rate, we should deﬁne the best strategy for Eve. In the
following analysis we consider two different kinds of Eve’s
strategy. Individual attacks (IAs), where Eve monitors the ququarts
independently from each other, and coherent attacks (CAs). CAs
instead are less conservative on Eve’s strategy, in fact she can
Fig. 1 a Schematic of the HD-QKD based on MCF using silicon PIC for Alice and Bob. The inset shows the cross-section of the multi-core ﬁber,
where four cores are used. b, d Shows the fabricated silicon PIC for Alice and Bob, respectively. c Presents the picture of the fabricated chips
with a 1 euro coin, indicating the compact size of the silicon PICs
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monitor more quantum states jointly. Intuitively CAs are less
stringent than IAs.
Let’s start our analysis under the assumption of IAs where Eve
uses a universal quantum cloning machine for qudits. By focusing
on the two MUBs we retrieve the mutual information between
Alice and Eve depending on the number of states N. In the case of
ququarts encoding we deﬁne four different quantum states as |0〉,
|1〉, |2〉, |3〉. The most general symmetric eavesdropping strategy
for ququarts can be written as:
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Under the assumption of symmetric attacks (Eve treats all the
input states with the same strategy) and following the approach
deﬁned in10 the ﬁdelity is: F ¼ Tr ψij i ψih jρoutB
 	
, where ρoutB is the
reduced density operator of the state send to Bob. The maximum
value of Eve’s mutual information is:
IAE ¼ log2 Nð Þ þ FE log2 FEð Þ þ 1 FEð Þlog2
1 FE
N  1
 
; (5)
where the corresponding optimal ﬁdelity for Eve is:
FE ¼ FN þ
N  1ð Þ 1 Fð Þ
N
þ 2
N
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N  1ð ÞF 1 Fð Þ
p
(6)
In other words, Eq. (5) represents the ability of Eve to distinguish
between N non-orthogonal states. In the case of IAs, the term IAE
can be easily formulated using FE instead of F in Eq. (4). By using
Eq. (3) we can deﬁne an upper bound on the disturbance D
introduce by Eve. We highlight that this limit increases with the
Hilbert space dimension (see Supplementary Information Table
S1). As evidence we report in Fig. 2 the theoretical mutual
information in case of different Hilbert space dimension (from N =
2 to N = 8) and under the assumption of IAs and CAs. The
intersections between the x-axis and the color ﬁlled/dashed lines
represent the QBER thresholds. The higher N used in the system,
the higher QBER threshold is allowed in the key generation. This
means that higher dimension used in the QKD protocol leads to
higher resilience to noise, allowing lower SNR for the received
signal, which can be be translated into longer transmission
distances. Following the same approach it is possible to deﬁned a
bound on Eve’s information related to the case of N + 1 MUBs.10
Let’s now consider a different strategy for Eve. As introduced
above in case of CAs, Eve collects a ﬁnite number of ququart
pulses, n <∞. In this case under the assumption made in10 and 31,
it is possible to deﬁne an upper bound on Eve’s information. The
condition IAB ≥ log2(N)/2 is a sufﬁcient case for guaranteeing the
security under CAs, if the key dimension l is much greater than n.31
To be stressed that all the previous bounds are true under the
assumption of inﬁnity key length, but a different approach can be
used for deﬁning security under the case of ﬁnite-key scenario.
High-dimensional decoy state analysis
Most of the QKD systems encode the bit information using
different degrees of freedom like polarization, phase and time,
carried by a train of weak coherent pulses (WCPs). This idea,
although unconditionally secure from a theoretical point of view, is
subjected to some limitation on a practical realization. In fact,
WCPs are obtained by attenuated laser with a mean photon
number per pulse, μ, lower than one. However, the Poissonian
distribution of the laser does not guarantee a non zero probability
of multi-photon states. In that case, Eve can easily stop all the
single photon pulses and split the multi-photon pulses (PNS—
photon number splitting attack). In such a way Eve can measure
the same information as Bob and after information reconciliation
Alice, Eve, and Bob share the same key. In order to overcome this
problem a simple strategy can be adopted-decoy state method.
During the transmission process, Alice randomly changes the mean
photon number per pulse.32 A intensity tunable laser or a real time
variable optical attenuator (VOA1) can be used to create different
levels of mean photon numbers. From a theoretical point of view
this technique, used with inﬁnite different number of decoy states,
permits to avoid the PNS attack and to increment the key rate for
further distances. However, as reported and proved in,32 two
different decoy values (plus a vacuum measurement), are sufﬁcient
to establish a good compromise between rate and security. Our
analysis follows the same procedure as introduced in,32 by using a
practical implementation of decoy-state method with two weak
decoy-states (with average photon ﬂux ν < μ < 1) and a vacuum
state. The ﬁnal secret key rate can be written as:
R  1
M
Q0 log2 Nð Þ þ Q1 log2 Nð Þ  hHD e1ð Þð Þ  QuhHD Dð Þf Dð Þ½ ;
(7)
where M is the number of bases used in the protocol (in our QKD
experiment we used M = 2), D is the overall QBER as already
deﬁned is the disturbance in the communication link, e1 is the
error-rate of the single-photon state and f(D) is the efﬁciency of
the error correction code (f(D) = 1.05). The Shannon entropy in
case of high-dimensionality can be adapted as hHD(x) = −xlog2(x/
(D−1))−(1−x)log2(1−x). The gain of the signal decoy state (i.e., the
probability of obtaining a detection when the signal state μ is
sent) is deﬁned like Qu ¼ Y0 þ 1 exp ημð Þ, where Y0 is the yield
of the vacuum state (probability of the dark counts) and η is the
overall efﬁciency (η = ηBobηABηd). The link transmittance parameter
ηAB ¼ 10αf L=10, where αf [dB/km] is the ﬁber losses (average
losses of a MCF about 0.2 dB/km) and L is the link distance in
kilometer. e0 is the QBER associated to the vacuum state (e0 =
(N−1)/N) corresponding to the probability of a random dark count
in one of the N detectors. The values of Qu and D can be directly
measured when Alice send the signal state to Bob. Q0 can be
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
QBER
0
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Fig. 2 Mutual information compared with different Hilbert space
dimension. The mutual information thresholds between Alice and
Bob/Eve in case of different Hilbert space dimensions and different
Eve’s strategy. These curves are obtained in the case of two MUBs
with individual and coherent attacks
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directly estimated as Q0 = e
−μY0. Note that Q0 log2(N) indicates the
gain relative to the dark counts, where Eve has no information.
However, the gain and the error of the single photon state (Q1 and
e1) must be approximated by the following formulas:
Q1  e
uu2
μν  ν2
 
Qve
ν  Queμ ν
2
μ2
 Y0 μ
2  ν2
μ2
 
(8)
e1  μ EvQve
ν  e0Y0ð Þ
ν Q1eu
(9)
By using the decoy-state method is possible to avoid the main
problem of the multi-photon state generated by the WCPs, used
in the current experiment. This technique allows to establish
an higher secret key rate for longer distances comparing the
performance of the same protocol without decoy-state.
Experimental results
The experimental scheme of the proposed HD-QKD based on MCF
using silicon PICs is shown in Fig. 1a (the detailed experimental
setup is presented in Supplementary Information, Fig. S2). WCPs
(10 ns wide, see also Supplementary Information) are injected into
the transmitter chip (Alice, Fig. 1b). The silicon PIC for Alice is used
to prepare the high-dimensional quantum states. The detailed
schematic of the chip design is found in Fig. S1 in Supplementary
Information. A VOA1 is used to thermally tune the pulse power to
prepare the decoy states. Cascaded MZIs associated with the four
thermally tunable phase shifters are used to prepare the quantum
states in the three MUB sets with mean number of photons per
pulse, μ, lower than 1. As an example, MZI 1 can be set so that
light goes to the upper arm. At the same time, MZI 2 can be set as
a 3 dB coupler. In this case, M0 basis is prepared, and states |A〉+|B〉
and |A〉−|B〉 can be prepared by controlling the phase difference
between the two output arms of MZI 2 to 0 or π, which is obtained
through thermally controlling φ1 and φ2. Similarly, the other
quantum states can be prepared by conﬁguring the correspond-
ing MZIs and phase shifters. The total insertion loss of Alice chip is
15 dB, which includes the coupling losses of the grating coupler
with the input single mode ﬁber and the grating coupler based
MCF fan-in/fan-out (FI/FO), and all the losses by other components
on the chip. The quantum states are coupled to four cores of a
multi-core ﬁber through an apodized grating coupler based MCF
FI/FO.33, 34 After the MCF, the quantum states are coupled into
Bobs chip (Fig. 1d) through the MCF FI/FO coupler, and randomly
measured in one of the MUBs by conﬁguring the corresponding
phase shifters and MZIs. For instance, by conﬁguring MZI 4 as a 3
dB coupler and setting MZI 6 and MZI 7 to directly go through,
Bob is conﬁgured to receive the quantum states in base M0.
In order to measure correctly the quantum states, it is critical to
obtain balanced losses for the four spatial channels, which is
enabled by four VOAs introduced in BOB’s chip. The total insertion
loss of Bob chip is 8 dB. We ﬁrstly measured the state tomography
of the 3 MUBs. Figure. 3a, b show the theoretically and the
experimental data acquired for the three MUBs. In this measure-
ments, a weak coherent pulse with μ < 0.1 at 10 kHz was injected
to Alice, and Bob acquires data for 30 s. The resulting ﬁdelity of the
AL
IC
E
AL
IC
E
AL
IC
E
AL
IC
E
AL
IC
EBOB
(a)
AL
IC
EBOB
(d)
BOB
(b)
BOB
(e)
BOB
(f)
BOB
(c)
Fig. 3 State tomography of the three MUBs: a, b, c represent the theoretical matrices of the different MUBs; d, e, f show the experimental
measurements of the same basis. The state tomography were obtained with 30 s of integration time using a CW 1550 nm laser modulated
with a 10 ns pulse at 10 kHz of repetition rate and a mean photon per pulse of 0.2± 0.006. By using the (classical) deﬁnition of ﬁdelity (F(x, y)
=∑i(piqi)1/2, where x and y are random variables and qi and pi are the vector of probability distribution), we obtain an average ﬁdelity of 0.977
± 0.01
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corresponding matrices are 0.973 ± 0.006; 0.981 ± 0.0064;0.975 ±
0.006 with an average value of 0.976 ± 0.0109. Secondly, as a proof
of concept, 3 m of MCF is used to prove a real-time QKD
experiment with two MUBs with a 5 kHz repetition rate (currently
limited by the on-chip thermal heaters, see supplementary
information). Alice, by using a PRBS sequence (8 bit) generated
by an FPGA, randomly chooses one of the four states in one of the
two bases and set the corresponding heaters in order to create
the required quantum state. Moreover, by randomly tuning the
VOA1 we implement the decoy-state technique. In particular the
decoy values are reported in Table 1, and represents the signal
and decoy state parameters. By using the same procedure, Bob’s
heaters are conﬁgured in one of the two MUBs. The choice of the
basis is randomly decided by a PRBS sequence (7 bit), generated
by the same FPGA. In the succeeding distillation process, counts
measured in the wrong basis are discarded. In Fig. 4a we presents
the QBER as a function of time and with an average value of μ =
0.276 ± 0.006 and ν = 0.153 ± 0.004 photon per pulse. Good and
stable QBER performance with an average value of 13% is
achieved for more than 10min, which is well below both coherent
attach limit and individual attach limit. In Fig. 4b we report the
measured value of the decoy-state gain Qu. The average value of
43.8 × 10−2 ± 0.9 × 10−2 indicates the low losses present on Alice
side and the stability of the MCFs grating coupler.
DISCUSSION
The results reported in Fig. 4a, b show a stable and good
demonstration of the HD-protocol. The average value of 13% of
the QBER, obtained over 10min of measurement, represents a
good point for the key extraction. Moreover, thanks to the on-chip
VOA1, we implemented a real-time decoy state technique. The
experiment was performed using two of three MUBs prepared and
showed in Fig. 3. We would like to highlight that the maximum
number of MUBs in an Hilbert space of four-dimension is ﬁve.
However, by using ﬁve MUBs we will compromise the ﬁnal secret
key rate. In fact, although the security increases using more bases,
the secret key rate (Eq. (7)) scales dependently with the number of
the bases. As reported in Table S1 of the Supplementary
information, for a space of four-dimension and in the case of
IAs, less than 6.5% of disturbance can be gained in the QBER
threshold respect to a leak of a factor 6/10 on the key rate. The
user must choose a trade off between security and rate,
depending on the actual conditions of the channel. As a
comparison, the case of multiple independent quantum keys
(one per each core) in a MCF must be considered. The ﬁnal
composed rate would possibly be higher as compared to the HD
one. However more strict requirements must be satisﬁed. As an
example, the QBER of the classical BB84 protocol must be lower
than 11% (Fig. 2), and after a long transmission distance the
ﬂuctuation of phase and polarization due to the perturbation in
the ﬁber becomes relevant. Furthermore, if we introduce the
concept of photon information efﬁciency 14 our HD-QKD allows a
gain of 0.65 bit/detected photon (from 0.806 to 1.461). In Fig. 5 we
show the simulation of the secret key rate as a function of the link
distance in the case of HD-QKD with decoy state, BB84 QKD with
decoy state and HD-QKD without decoy state. It follows that the
best performance in terms of rate and achievable distance is
reached with the case of HD-QKD and decoy-state. We also traced,
as a comparison, the experimental data acquired by using the four
VOAs integrated in Bob’s chip in order to simulate the link losses.
It is well known in optical communication, that phase and
polarization of coherent light is changed in a long optical ﬁber
transmission. This effect is mainly due to the environment
changes during transmission. In a MCF, each core acts indepen-
dently from the other with very low crosstalk. However the phase
and polarization of photons drift independently in each core. In
our experiment this effect was mitigated by the short link
distance, but in a real QKD system it must be considered. A close
(a)
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Fig. 4 Experimental results. a QBER for 10min of acquired data. The
blue line represents the average QBER about 13%, which is well
below the limits of both coherent attach and individual attacks. b
Measured value of the signal-state gain Qu. The average value of
43.8 × 10−2± 0.9 × 10−2 indicates the low losses present on Alice side
and the stability of the MCFs grating coupler
Table 1. Measured parameter of the decoy-state method used in the
current experiment
Parameter Experimental value
Qu 43.8 × 10
−2± 0.9 × 10−2
Eu 0.136± 0.011
Qv 24.3 × 10
−2± 0.7 × 10−2
Ev 0.118± 0.013
Q0 1.2 × 10
−5± 7 × 10−8
In particular we used a two-value (ν< μ< 1) and vacuum decoy-state.
Fig. 5 Comparison between experimental data and theoretical
simulation. We overlapped the experimental data with the expected
theoretical rate as a function of the link distance. The parameters
used are: pdark= 2 × 10
−8, ηd= 0.1, αloss= 0.2 dB/km, u= 0.3, v= 0.15
for the decoy rates. Blue solid line is the rate without decoy state in
case of WCP HD-QKD. Red and black solid lines are the simulated
decoy state key rate for qubit or ququart encoding
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loop phase stabilization system can be implemented for a longer
transmission distance, as reported in.35 In order to avoid inﬂuence
by polarization drift, two different strategies can be used. Firstly, a
two dimensional grating coupler associated with an MZI36 can be
used to couple with the cores of the MCF, so that the polarization
for each core can be tuned independently. Moreover, the
polarization dependence can be solved by an on-chip polarization
diversity circuit37, 38 for Bob’s chip. In addition, Bob is performing
interference between cores for receiving quantum states in
different basis, thus the time delay between each cores should
be matched after long transmission. This problem can be solved
by introducing a cascaded delay28 on Alice chip.
The pulse rate used in this experiment of 10 kHz (for
characterization) and 5 kHz (for the real-time QKD experiment)
represents the main limitation for a long link deployment of this
technology. The main limitation is the slow thermal dynamics of
the heaters used in our experiment. In fact, despite a very high
extinction ratio and good stability, the thermal tunable MZIs on
Alice’s and Bob’s chips have low switching time of 66 and 27 μs for
rise and fall time, as detailed in Supplementary Information.
In order to overcome this problem, two main ideas can be
implemented. Different kinds of material, such as graphene, that
has ultra-high thermal conductivity enabling sub-microsecond
tuning speed can be investigated.39, 40 Ultra-high speed p-i-n or p-
n junction,41, 42 or silicon-lithium niobate hybrid integration43 can
also be utilized for the phase shifters to further increase the
repetition rate. The insertion loss of receiver chip is critical for ﬁnal
key rate. Our current device has an insertion loss of 8 dB, which
attributes from the ~4 dB coupling loss of the grating couplers.
More efﬁcient grating couplers44 can be applied to improve
the coupling loss. In addition, signiﬁcant improvements will be
achieved by introducing an aluminum (Al) mirror below the
grating couplers to improve the coupling efﬁciency.45, 46
Once these technical problems is solved, the idea of space
multiplexing HD-QKD can be considered feasible for an end-to-
end high-rate transmission over long distance. Moreover, thanks
to the advantages of state of the art silicon photonics, laser
sources can be integrated on Alice chip in order to create a
miniaturized quantum transmitter. Transistors, switches, digita-
analog converters (DACs) and other electronic devices can also be
integrated on a silicon substrate creating a stable and powerful
chip. On the receiver side, fully demonstration of single photon
detector on chip was already proved during the last years.47
The best solution for HD-QKD is based on single photon arrays. In
this way the scalability of the process can be improved and higher
capacity protocols can be implemented.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Device fabrication
The silicon PICs was fabricated on the commercial SOI wafer with top
silicon thickness of 250 nm and buried oxide layer (BOX) of 1 μm. A single
step of standard SOI processing, including e-beam lithography and
inductively coupled plasma etching was ﬁrst used to fabricate the whole
silicon PIC simultaneously. A 1500 nm thick layer of SiO2 was then
deposited on top of the chip by plasma-enhanced chemical vapor
deposition. The chip surface was then polished, and the top SiO2 was
thinned down to 1 μm accordingly. The 1 μm SiO2 was used as an isolation
layer between the silicon waveguide and the Ti heaters fabricated later to
avoid potential optical losses. Afterwards, the 100 nm thick titanium
heaters are formed by e-beam lithography followed by metal deposition
and liftoff process. After that, the thick Au/Ti contact layer was fabricated
by UV lithography followed by metal deposition and liftoff process. The
chip was then cleaved and wire-bonded to a PCB board, and controlled by
ﬁeld programmable gate array (FPGA) for system experiment.
Electronic design
The chip-to-chip HD-QKD based on space-division multiplexing is feasible
thank to a real time control of the different MZIs presented on the silicon
chip. These MZIs, as reported above, are controlled by heaters: conductor
material which change his property when a voltage is applied. In order to
tune in real-time these MZIs, different electrical signals are required in the
transmitter and receiver side. An Altera FPGA board emits eight digital
parallel outputs every 0.2 ms, which are converted into analog voltages by
eight DACs. Then, these analog signals are send to the transmitter and the
receiver PCB board by ﬂat cables.
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